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Cognitive Penetration and Attention
Steven Gross*
Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to
cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after
early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual
processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he
emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early
vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be direct and
exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found
in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should
not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive
penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism.
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INTRODUCTION
What we think can affect what we see. For example, if you want some chocolate and think it is to
your left, you might turn to look that way. What you now see will differ from what you saw before:
a half-eaten bar on the counter rather than the empty cupboard. In this case, a kind of attention
plays a mediating role: what you think causes you to change the orientation of your gaze, which in
turn has obvious effects on what you see.
What does this show about the relation between cognition (that is, higher cognition, or
conception) and perception? Certainly, it shows that there are ways the former can causally affect
the latter. Does it show something more significant? Might it require a reconception of cognitive
architecture—perhaps even call into question the distinction between perception and conception?
Might it deprive us of a theory-neutral basis for adjudicating among competing hypotheses, or
undermine perception’s apparent role in providing independent warrant to beliefs?
At least for the case at hand, this seems unlikely (however, interesting it may otherwise
be). Because cognitive effects on perception via bodily movement are both unsurprising and
indirect, it is unclear how they might challenge or reshape the distinction between seeing and
thinking. Because this sort of attention can be so readily redirected, it is not obvious how it might
render potential evidence inaccessible when comparing theories. And because it seems to filter
information (for example, having you look here, not there) but not alter that which it selects, it
would seem only to constrain the basis for one’s beliefs, not to affect the epistemic relevance of
what one does see.
But the case at hand is particularly unsubtle. In other cases, one’s eyes can move in perceptually
consequential ways without one’s realizing it, even upon reflection: eye-tracking was required
to demonstrate the role of saccades in flipping ambiguous images (e.g., Stark and Ellis, 1981).
Moreover, attention is not limited to overt attention (the reorientation of gaze through bodily
movement). Even with one’s gaze fixed, covert attention can shift among locations, features, and
objects. In such cases, the implications for perception’s epistemic function and the perception-
cognition relation are less clear and more controversial. One example: when attentional effects on
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perception are less obvious, so are their potential biasing effects
on belief—whether malign (the neglect of contrary evidence in
confirmation bias) or beneficial (when attention prevents us from
missing what is most relevant). Another example, which will play
a larger role in our discussion: because the mechanisms of covert
attention seem more bound up with perceptual processing itself,
a cognitive influence upon them appears to amount to a direct
effect on perception in a way that cognition’s effects upon overt
attention do not.
Questions concerning cognition’s bearing on perception
are often framed in terms of the cognitive penetrability
or impenetrability of perception. Applied to our topic, the
question is thus whether cognitively driven attentional effects
on perception can amount to cognitive penetration. But talk of
cognitive penetration gets cashed out in various ways, so that the
answer depends on just what cognitive penetration is supposed
to be.
In what follows, we approach the question using Zenon
Pylyshyn’s characterization of cognitive penetration. It was he
who coined the term, but, more importantly, his conception
is well-motivated, as we will indicate in a moment. A further
justification for our focus is that, although much subsequent
discussion has centered on Pylyshyn’s claims, his resources for
precluding attentional effects from the purview of cognitive
penetration have not been fully explored or exploited either by
Pylyshyn himself or his other defenders.
Pylyshyn’s concern is the degree to which visual perception is
“continuous” with cognition. More specifically, he asks whether
early visual states interact with cognitive states in the way
cognitive states do with one another—in particular, by mirroring
rational relations. Early vision would be cognitively penetrated,
on his view, if “the function early vision computes is sensitive,
in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and
beliefs” (Pylyshyn, 1999a, p. 343). With this characterization in
hand, he argues that cognitively driven attentional effects, though
they provide the primary means by which cognition affects
perception, do not amount to cognitive penetration. Indeed,
showing that various phenomena offered in evidence of cognitive
penetration in fact involve subtle attentional effects is among
his principle strategies for rebutting others’ claims. Thus, he
counters Churchland’s (1988) discussion of cognitive effects on
the perception of ambiguous figures by adducing the evidence
mentioned above for the role of eye movement in bringing about
perceptual flips.
We agree that, when cognitive penetration is understood
in Pylyshyn’s way, cognitively driven attentional effects on
perception do not amount to cognitive penetration—but not
for the reason Pylyshyn emphasizes. Pylyshyn maintains that
attentional effects occur either before or after early vision and
thus do not directly affect early vision itself. Critics have focused
on this claim, replying that in fact attention is bound up with
perceptual processes at all levels. This in part accounts for a
rising tide of attention-based cognitive penetrability claims (e.g.,
Lupyan, 2015; Mole, 2015; Wu, forthcoming). But there are
other bases for excluding attentional effects from the purview of
cognitive penetration. In particular, cognitively driven attentional
effects fail to satisfy the requirement that there be semantically
coherent sensitivity to cognitive states—or so we shall argue.
Along the way, we differentiate our defense from those found
in recent work by Raftopoulos (2009) and Firestone and Scholl
(2015, 2016); and we respond to views that would assimilate
attention to expectation and thereby argue that Pylyshyn’s
criterion can be met.
But are the significant questions best framed in Pylyshyn’s
terms? We conclude by considering other conceptions of
cognitive penetration advanced in the literature, some of which
do and some of which do not count cognitively driven attentional
effects on perception as cognitive penetration. We consider as
well how one might decide among them. In the end, we advocate
a kind of pluralism, suggesting that there may be no one question
of cognitive penetrability, but a variety of interesting successors—
and so no one answer to the question concerning attention
with which we begin. Pylyshyn’s conception is motivated, but
others may be as well. Of course understanding the various
ways cognition and perception interact and their upshot is more
important than determining if there are phenomena worthy of
Pylyshyn’s label. But this conclusion does not undermine the
interest of our earlier exploration of attention and cognitive
penetration as Pylyshyn defines it: first, it is among the various
interesting questions; and, second, considering questions of
cognitive penetrability, including what cognitive penetrability
should be, is a useful strategy for delineating the various
interesting questions, even if it is a ladder one then throws away.
ATTENTION AND COGNITIVE
PENETRATION IN PYLYSHYN’S SENSE
To see why Pylyshyn holds that cognitively driven attentional
effects on perception do not amount to cognitive penetration
(and how else it might be defended), we should first clarify his
conception of cognitive penetration. A few remarks concerning
the relevant kind of attention will also prove useful.
Pylyshyn’s Conception of Cognitive
Penetration
Roughly, cognition penetrates perception just in case it causally
affects perception in the right kind of way (that is, subject to
some sort of further constraints on the kind of causal effect).
But views vary as to what counts as cognition, perception, and
causing in the right kind of way. These differences matter for
whether attentional effects can count as cognitive penetration.
Pylyshyn, we saw, is concerned with whether “the function early
vision computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to
the organism’s goals and beliefs.” As he also puts it, cognitive
penetration requires that early vision “can be altered in a way
that bears some logical relation to what the person knows;” an
instance of cognitive penetration must “alter the contents of
perceptions in a way that is logically connected to the contents
of beliefs, expectations, values, and so on” (Pylyshyn, 1999a,
p. 343). The relevant cognitive states—the admissible source
of would-be cognitive penetration—thus comprise for Pylyshyn
the so-called propositional attitudes. The relevant target of his
impenetrability claim is not perception tout court, which he
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claims is cognitively penetrable (Pylyshyn, 1999a, p. 344), but
just so-called early vision, a substantial portion of the perceptual
processes implicated in visual perception. It is question just
what early vision comprises. Pylyshyn mentions, for example,
the calculation of stereo, motion, size, and lightness constancies
(Pylyshyn, 1999a, p. 344). But we need not pursue the matter,
since the considerations we ultimately adduce in Pylyshyn’s
defense do not rest on a particular conception of, and are not
limited to potential effects on, early vision.
Finally, for the causal effect of cognition on early vision
to count as the “right kind,” the representational contents of
the cognitive states and of the affected early vision states must
be related in a way that satisfies two conditions. First, early
vision must itself have “access” (Pylyshyn, 1999a, p. 344 and
passim) to the cognitive states. The cognitive states must exert
their influence because early vision’s computations take their
contents into account by operating over them, not just because
the cognitive states have effects on other states over which early
vision computes. In this sense, the influence must be direct.
Second, the contents of the cognitive states and the contents
of the affected early vision states must stand in a relation of
semantic coherence—or, as he also puts it, a logical or rational
relation:
We sometimes use the term “rational” in speaking of cognitive
processes or cognitive influences. This term is meant to
indicate that in characterizing such processes we need to refer
to what the beliefs are about—to their semantics. The paradigm
case of such a process is inference, where the semantic
property truth is preserved. But we also count various heuristic
reasoning and decision-making strategies (e.g., satisficing,
approximating, or even guessing) as rational because, however,
suboptimal they may be by some normative criterion, they
do not transform representations in a semantically arbitrary
way: they are in some sense at least quasi-logical. This is the
essence of what we mean by cognitive penetration: it is an
influence that is coherent or quasi-rational when the meaning
of the representation is taken into account (Pylyshyn, 1999a,
p. 365, fn. 3).
These formulations raise further questions, but the basic idea
of one representation not just causing another, but providing a
reason for it, will suffice for our purposes.1 The requirements
of directness and semantic coherence articulate the kind of
“sensitivity” cognitive penetration requires. It is not enough that
the contents of early vision states be sensitive to those of cognitive
states in the weaker sense of depending counterfactually,
statistically, or in a law-like manner upon them. They must also
do so in virtue of early vision itself operating over the cognitive
states in a manner that mirrors a rational relation.
1This gloss on Pylyshyn’s constraint is more demanding than others found in the
literature—cf. Stokes, 2013 for discussion—but it finds support in the quoted text.
If it is not evident how the content of a cognitive state might supply a reason
bearing on that of a perceptual state (as opposed to vice versa), recall that, at
least since Helmholtz, it has been common to think of perception as engaged in
something like inference: the question then is whether (and, if so, how) cognitive
states can contribute to this inference-like process. Models on which they can are
discussed below.
Not all parties to cognitive penetrability disputes characterize
the would-be phenomenon in this way. In particular, some drop
the requirement of directness, and many drop the requirement
of semantic coherence. We canvass some of these alternatives
below. For now, we underscore Pylyshyn’s motivation. Pylyshyn
is interested in whether vision and cognition are “continuous,”
as New Look psychology suggests (Bruner, 1957). A central
feature of propositional attitudes is that they do directly affect one
another in semantically coherent ways. Indeed, their availability
for rational inference about what to believe and what to
do—and the conceptual structure this imposes upon them—is
among their most important functional features. If perceptual
states—more specifically, states of early vision—interacted with
propositional attitudes in a similar way, this would be a
strong argument for a crucial continuity with them. If they
do not, it is a crucial discontinuity. Establishing Pylyshyn’s
thesis thus helps mark and preserve at least an aspect of
the perception-cognition distinction itself. It is important to
note, however, that the (not necessarily exhaustive) distinction
need not rest solely upon this discontinuity. For example, one
might also differentiate perceptions and cognitions by their
relative stimulus-dependence—more specifically, whether it is
their function to represent the here and now (cf. Pylyshyn,
1999a, p. 343; also Burge, 2010). (Pylyshyn, 2002, however, rejects
one oft-proposed basis for drawing a perception/conception
distinction: that the former have iconic and the latter symbolic
representational formats.)
Kinds of Attention
Attention comprises a variety of phenomena and is perhaps
something of a motley (Allport, 1993). But we can pinpoint, or at
least minimally clarify, what kind of attentional effect is at issue
here.
Attentional phenomena sub-divide in various, sometimes
cross-cutting ways. Attention can be external (selecting
and modulating sensory information) or internal (selecting,
modulating, and maintaining memories, choices, responses, and
other non-sensory representations) (Chun et al., 2011). Our
focus is of course external attention, since we are considering
a candidate case of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
As mentioned, if external attention involves the movement of
sensory organs, it is overt; otherwise, it is covert. It is widely
agreed that cognitive effects on perception mediated by overt
attention—as with our example of looking to the left because one
wants some chocolate and believes that is where it is—should not
count as cognitive penetration, because the effect is not direct or
because admitting them would render the topic uncontroversial.
Thus, our focus is covert attention. Note, though, that cases
of pure overt attention shifts may be atypical. For among the
hypothesized functions of covert attention is to prepare or guide
overt attention shifts, for example by highlighting a target for
eye movement or visual search (Kowler, 2011; Nakayama and
Martini, 2011). (Another hypothesized function, relevant to
social cognition, is to allow undetectable attention shifts—see
Laidlaw et al., 2016) Cases of cognitively driven overt attention
shifts could therefore involve cognitive penetration—albeit not
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in virtue of their overt aspect—if concomitant cognitively driven
covert attentional shifts can amount to cognitive penetration.
Cases of covert attention can be classified by what drives
them. Exogenous attention is driven directly by external cues
in a bottom–up fashion, as when attention is captured by
a sudden noise. Endogenous attention is driven from within
in a top-down fashion. The top–down processes involved in
endogenous attention can, however, occur in response to an
external cue, as is typically the case in experimental settings.
Endogenous and exogenous cues differ according to whether they
must be in some sense understood. For example, whereas an
exogenous cue might increase attention to a location by simply
occurring there, an endogenous cue might do so by indicating
that location via an arrow or by a symbolic description (‘up’).
Because endogenous cues must be understood, they achieve their
attentional effects by engaging mechanisms and cortical areas
different from those required for exogenously driven attentional
effects; and there is a corresponding difference in time-course:
300 ms from endogenous cue to attention shift, compared
to a 100–120 ms peak for exogenous cues (Carrasco, 2011).
However, that a cue generates an endogenous shift in attention
might not of itself entail that the shift is cognitively driven in
Pylyshyn’s sense. It is possible that the relevant representation
or association (e.g., of an arrow and a direction) is contained
within perception itself, or comes to be over a course of trials
(Pratt and Hommel, 2003; Stevens et al., 2008; Pratt et al.,
2010). This is just a particular instance of a point proponents
of cognitive impenetrability have always emphasized: that top–
down does not entail cognitive, since top-down processing can
occur within perception itself (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999a).
That said, cognitively driven attention is of necessity endogenous.
So, we will only be concerned with it.
Raftopoulos and Lupyan (2017), in laying out the research
topic to which this paper is a contribution, make special mention
of pre-stimulus cues. It is thus worth noting that the only role
external cues play in endogenous attention is to generate the
internal states that then cause the attention shift. In that sense,
the cue’s role is indirect and essentially irrelevant once its job
is done. Perhaps, then, there is no special question of whether
cognitively driven attentional effects on perception brought on by
pre-stimulus cueing (as opposed to, say, an unprompted decision
to attend in a certain way) count as cognitive penetration—that
is, nothing further to ask beyond whether cognitively driven
attentional effects on perception count as cognitive penetration
more generally. This turns out to be the case given Pylyshyn’s
conception of cognitive penetration: what brought about the
cognitively driven attentional effect will be irrelevant to the
considerations we adduce. (There may be, however, as indicated
above, a question whether particular endogenous attentional
effects are in fact cognitively driven.)2
2Whether a cognitively driven attentional effect was brought about by pre-cueing
could matter for others’ arguments. For example, as we will see, Raftopoulos (2009)
puts much weight on time-course considerations. Suppose that what brings about a
cognitively driven attentional effect matters to the subsequent time-course of that
effect on early vision. It would then be of note if, say, attentional effects brought
about by pre-cueing occurred within the window of early visual processing,
while effects brought about by a decision to attend could not. The importance
Finally, cases of covert attention can also be classified by
their object—i.e., what one attends to. Work over the last few
decades typically distinguishes spatial, feature-based, and object-
based attention (Carrasco, 2011). (For simplicity, we bracket
temporal attention, a special case that is arguably not as well
understood and perhaps spans the external/internal divide. See
Nobre and Coull, 2010; Phillips, 2012; Gross, in preparation).
This classification matters for certain arguments mentioned
below, but its importance will fade once we focus on our
alternative defense of Pylyshyn’s claim.
PYLYSHYN’S ARGUMENT AND ITS
CRITICS
Pylyshyn maintains that cognitively driven attentional effects—
whether overt or covert—do not provide examples of cognitive
penetration of early vision. His main argument is that attentional
effects either help determine the inputs to early vision or
help select from among its outputs.3 Attentional effects may
indirectly affect early vision (even selection effects after early
vision may indirectly affect early vision—for example by causing
an effect on its subsequent inputs). But because they involve
no direct effect on early visual processing itself, they do not
exhibit a way “the function early vision computes is sensitive,
in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and
beliefs.”
Critics respond that attentional effects are found at all levels,
or stages, of processing. Thus, either they occur in early vision
or, if early vision is to be insulated from them, there seems
nothing substantial left for early vision to be. Talk of levels can be
cashed out in various ways. Yeh and Chen (1999), for example,
argue that results finding attentional effects at various cortical
levels leave little space for an attentionally insulated stage of
of such a difference would be lessened, however, if such effects need not occur
“online”—that is during early visual processing—to be relevant to questions of
cognitive penetrability, but could instead affect subsequent early visual processing.
Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis (2015, p. 23) raise the possibility that, because “pre-
cueing does not affect visual processing in a direct, online way, but just sets
the initial values of certain parameters for subsequent computations,” it does
not amount to cognitive penetration. But it is unclear whether computationally
there is a substantive difference between directly supplying an input and fixing a
parameter (and whether it matters if one happens before the other). Our discussion
of semantic coherence might supply a way of cashing out this difference. But
then the relevant distinction is not one particular to pre-stimulus cueing. (Note,
incidentally, concerning relative timing, that what matters—if it does—would be
that the input/parameter fixing from cognition occurs before sensory input from
the stimulus, not that the endogenous cue that drives cognition comes before the
stimulus.)
3I say that this is his main argument—and elsewhere that this is the argument
he emphasizes—because, just after providing his characterization of cognitive
penetrability, he illustrates it as follows:
Note that changes produced by shaping basic sensors, say by attenuating
or enhancing the output of certain feature detectors (perhaps through focal
attention), do not count as cognitive penetration because they do not alter the
contents of perceptions in a way that is logically connected to the contents of
beliefs, expectations, values, and so on, regardless of how the latter are arrived
at (Pylyshyn, 1999a, p. 343).
But the rest of his many remarks on attentional effects focus solely on their being
prior or posterior to early vision.
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early vision. (Cf. Lupyan, 2015, p. 560: “As is now well-known,
attention modulates processing at all levels of the visual hierarchy
. . .. Prima facie, these findings appear to be devastating for
opponents of the [cognitive penetrability of perception] thesis
. . ..”) Pylyshyn (1999b, p. 410) replies that one cannot assume
a straightforward mapping between cortical and computational
stages, and it is the latter with which he is concerned. However,
subsequent attention research has arguably trended towards a
convergence of behavioral and neurophysiological data that shifts
the burden onto anyone who would defend Pylyshyn’s claim that
attentional effects are external to early vision. As Carrasco (2011,
pp. 1485–1486) writes in summing up the preceding 25 years of
research:
Initially, there was a great deal of interest in categorizing
mechanisms of vision as pre-attentive or attentive [i.e.,
involving selection after early vision]. The interest in that
distinction has waned as many studies have shown that
attention actually affects tasks that were once considered
pre-attentive, such as contrast discrimination, texture
segmentation and acuity. . .. this review focuses on the
effect of attention on basic visual dimensions where the
best mechanistic understanding of attention to date has been
achieved, such as contrast sensitivity and spatial resolution [. . .
and . . .] motion processing . . .. due to the existence of models
of these visual dimensions, as well as to the confluence of
psychophysical, single-unit recording, neuroimaging studies,
and computational models, all indicating that attention
modulates early vision.
Note that an “all levels” claim can affirm that the fundamental
function of attention is to cull inputs. This is a natural idea whose
mechanisms are becoming better understood. (For example,
recent work suggests that attention’s primarily function is to
select among stimuli and thus reduce the cost of stimulus mixing
in cortical response, not to increase response sensitivity or reduce
noise via an increase in gain in relevant areas. See Pestilli et al.,
2011; Orhan and Ma, 2015). What an ‘all levels’ claim rejects is
just that this culling of inputs does not occur inter alia within
early vision. (Note that the inputs to be culled could be sensory
inputs or inputs provided by one computational mechanism to
the next.) Firestone and Scholl’s (2016, pp. 23–24) reply—citing,
incidentally, the same Carrasco survey—to the objection that not
all attentional shifts are like moving one’s eyes would thus cut no
ice if directed against the “all levels” complaint:
. . . fundamentally, “attention is a selective process” that
modulates “early perceptual filters” (Carrasco, 2011, pp. 1485–
1486, emphasis added). This is what we mean when we speak of
attention as constraining input: attention acts as a “filter” that
“selects” the information for downstream visual processing,
which may itself be impervious to cognitive influence.
If this selection occurs at “all levels”—in particular, at each stage
of processing within early vision—it remains the case that no
substantial component of visual perception may remain that is
“impervious to cognitive influence.”
There are indeed ways one might attempt to defend Pylyshyn’s
claim that attentional effects are external to early vision, either
preceding or following it. But their prospects are inessential to
our main point: we argue that one can in any event defend
on other Pylyshian grounds the claim that cognitively driven
attentional effects on early vision do not amount to cognitive
penetration. However, because debate has focused on where
attentional effects are felt, we provide a brief indication of
possible directions one might explore on this front. Theeuwes
(2013) argues that all feature-based attention involves bottom-
up priming. Having perceived a certain feature, one’s perceptual
system is then primed to perceive it again, regardless of its
location or the object that has it. Previous work, he argues,
missed this by presenting subjects with blocks of trials that
did not control for stimulus history. When stimulus history
is controlled for, feature-based attentional effects disappear. If
he is right, this removes one candidate category of cognitively
driven attentional effects. Recent work indicates that object-based
attention is likewise subject to the effects of stimulus history (Lee
et al., 2012). A rather hopeful defender might speculate that it too
might all be bottom-up. Alternatively, she might pin her hopes on
the minority view that apparent object-based attentional effects
are really spatial (see Reppa et al., 2012 for references and critical
discussion). But, failing that, it may be conceded in any event that
object-based attentional effects occur only after early vision. This
would leave spatial attention. As we noted, the work of Carrasco
and others suggests that attentional effects are entwined with
perceptual processing throughout early vision. But Schneider
(2006, 2011) attempts to explain their results by positing an
attentional effect on salience and a post-perceptual decision bias
in favor of salient items, rather than an attentional effect on
perceptual content. On this view, salience, though a property of
perceptions, is not something itself represented in perception.
By affecting salience, attention might have a kind of effect on
perceptual processing at “all levels” on such a view, but not the
kind relevant to cognitive penetration—viz., an effect on content.
It would only have that kind of effect post-perceptually, at the
level of perception-based judgment. (See Beck and Schneider,
forthcoming for philosophical discussion, replying to Block,
2010.) If these moves (or others) were to pan out, they would
vindicate Pylyshyn’s claim that attentional effects—or at least
the relevant ones—are all external to early vision. Many will
consider that a big if. We now argue that the claim it was intended
to subserve—that cognitively driven attentional effects on early
vision do not amount to cognitive penetration—can be defended
in any event. Discussion need not fixate on the locus of attentional
effect.
AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE OF
PYLYSHYN’S CLAIM
If cognitively driven attentional effects were all external to early
vision, that would suffice to show that they are indirect: the
function early vision computes would not be sensitive to them
in a semantically coherent way. But showing that they are in
fact internal does not yet show that Pylyshyn’s requirements
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on cognitive penetrability are satisfied. Are there grounds for
thinking they are not?
It might be thought that it does not matter where in processing
the effect is felt: the effect must be indirect simply because
it is mediated by attention, so that, even when cognitively
driven attention exerts its influence on early vision (not just
on inputs to early vision), this involves first cognition affecting
attention, which then in turn affects early vision. But Mole (2015)
argues that whatever plausibility this thought may have for overt
attention, it requires a mistaken picture of covert attention as
a faculty or capacity distinct from perception and capable of
causally affecting it—as opposed to its just being itself a certain
kind of effect in perception.4 If covert attentional effects are a part
of perceptual processing, then, pending the identification of other
mediating factors, cognitive effects on perception supposedly
mediated by covert attention are direct effects on perception.
The indirectness objection, however, can be pressed in a more
subtle way. To see how, consider what occurs when cognitively
driven attention affects early vision (not via an effect on sensory
input to early vision). The decision to attend can spring wholly
from within (we consider such a case below), but in a typical
experiment the subject responds to an endogenous cue—what
is in effect an instruction from the experimenter. For example,
if the cue is an arrow pointing up or the word ‘up,’ it is an
instruction to attend there. If the case is to satisfy Pylyshyn’s
criteria for being cognitively driven, the subject will come to have
an intention or other action-directed attitude to attend there.
She will do this on the basis of such other attitudes as her
belief that she has been instructed to attend there, her desire to
cooperate, etc. Our suggestion is that these attitudes generate
what we might call an attentional command to attend there,
which—on a causal-computational account—would exert its
influence on perceptual processing, affecting perceptual content
(at least on the common view suggested by Carrasco’s work and
others’—we put aside here Schneider’s animadversions). If the
ascription of this attentional command seems fanciful, consider
that it is common for computational models of perceptual
attention to include attentional parameters that weight the effect
of sensory signals (e.g., Lee and Maunsell’s (2009) divisive
normalization model, brought to bear on cognitive penetration
in Wu (forthcoming)). ‘Attend to this, this much’ is a natural way
to gloss their content. And possess content they must if we are
so much as to have a candidate case of cognitive penetrability in
Pylyshyn’s sense. (In discussing attention and expectation below,
we consider models that would dispense with such parameters.)5
Now, if the directness aspect of Pylyshyn’s criterion is to be
satisfied, perception must have access to and operate over relevant
cognitive states: the values of cognitive states must be among
the inputs to perceptual processes. One way to defend Pylyshyn’s
4Cf. Raftopoulos (2009) and Anderson (2011). Mole (2015) develops the point with
reference to Desimone (1998) and Duncan’s (1998) biased competition model of
attention. Gross (2016) critically discusses some aspects of Mole’s arguments. (For
someone claiming that attention is a cognitive process, see Lupyan, 2015, p. 560.)
5On some views, perception-based demonstrative reference in thought requires
prior attention to the demonstratum (Campbell, 2002). The apparent circle can
be avoided by denying this requirement or by distinguishing among attentional
mechanisms (Wu, forthcoming).
cognitive impenetrability claim, then, is to argue that (1) the
attentional command is not itself a cognitive representation, and
(2), although the attentional command plays a role in perceptual
processing, the attitudes that generate it do not. The attitudes
that generate the attentional command are thus not accessed,
and the attentional command is not cognitive; so, no cognitive
state is accessed. Perception, by not accessing the cognitive
states themselves, would thus not be in that sense sensitive to
them; it would only feel the causal effect of those states. We
could still say, with Mole (2015), that there is a sense in which
cognition affects perceptual processing in an unmediated way.
For the cognitive states, on this view, could directly generate the
attentional command, itself a part of perceptual processing. And
yet, in another sense, we would have to say that there is mediation
after all: for, though the attentional command may be directly
generated by cognitive states, the attentional effect on perception
would not be. We can think of the effect either as the result
brought about or as the bringing about of the result. In the latter
sense, the attentional effect consists in the attentional command
exerting its influence and thereby affecting perceptual content
(the actual transition from one representational state to another,
as brought about in part by the attentional command—in other
words, the calculation of the function in which the attentional
command is a term). In the former sense, it is just the resulting
perceptual state (or perhaps some aspect it would otherwise
not have had). Either way, the attentional effect would not be
directly generated by cognitive states. Moreover, consider the
state that is directly affected—the attentional command. Though
it is perhaps (if we deny it cognitive status) a representational
state in perception, it is not itself a perceptual state, at least in the
sense of a state whose function is to represent the here and now.
Thus, cognition’s direct effect on it does not constitute cognitive
penetration of perception.
Perhaps, when all is said and done, this is correct. But it might
not be the most convincing way to defend Pylyshyn’s position.
For it is unclear on what basis one can compellingly persuade
a proponent of cognitive penetrability that the attentional
command is not a cognitive representation. In particular, to
base one’s case on the fact that it interacts with perceptual
representations would just beg the question: that perceptual
processes can have access to cognitive states is precisely what a
proponent of cognitive penetration in Pylyshyn’s sense claims.
A stronger argument instead incorporates the preceding
considerations into a dilemma. For if the attentional command
is considered a cognitive state, its influence on perception
runs afoul of the semantic coherence constraint—so that
cognitive penetrability is blocked whichever status one assigns
the attentional command. Recall that the semantic coherence
constraint requires that the content of the accessed cognitive
state bear an inferential relation to the content of the resulting
perceptual state. Attending may exert a causal effect on what one
sees. But it does not provide an epistemic basis for it. Here a
comparison with turning on a light is appropriate (cf. Firestone
and Scholl, 2015, p. 8). Turning on a light—perhaps in response
to a request—might enable one to see that there is something red
there, but not because the turning on of the light is evidence for
it. Matters stand otherwise in cases where, according to Pylyshyn,
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the semantic criterion is met. In late vision, he claims, we might
draw upon various beliefs to identify some object. If early vision
outputs a representation of an object as having such-and-such
shape and coloring, etc., we may access any number of beliefs in
coming to then represent the object as Ms. Jones—for instance,
beliefs about what Ms. Jones, as opposed to other persons and
things, looks like (Pylyshyn, 1999a, p. 344). The content of these
beliefs do not just cause, but provide an epistemic basis for
the resulting representation of this as Ms. Jones. Similarly, for
the claimed influence of color memories (that hearts are red,
bananas yellow) on color perception (Delk and Fillenbaum, 1965;
Macpherson, 2012; Gross et al., 2014; Witzel and Hansen, 2015).
Indeed, intentions and commands are not the sorts of states
that can provide reasons in the relevant sense. They do not
provide epistemic grounds, though they can be related to reasons
for action. To attend is a kind of act (a mental act—cf. O’Brien
and Soteriou, 2009); and, unless it is just a whim, when one
forms an intention to attend, one does so on the basis of
reasons to attend—in the experimental setting, because you are
instructed to so attend and want to cooperate. There is thus
an appropriate semantic relation between the relevant cognitive
attitudes and the attentional command. Arguably, there is also an
appropriate semantic relation between the attentional command
and the carrying out of what it commands (viz., the mental act
of attending itself). But what there is not is a semantic relation
between the attentional command (or the attending) and the
resulting perceptual state, the state that exhibits the attentional
effect. One might have good reason to turn on a light, and one’s
doing so might cause you see to see a red thing there. But the
reasons for turning on the light (viz., because you were asked)
do not supply any epistemic basis for what you see—that is, for
there being something red there—nor does your turning on the
light constitute any such reasons. Just so with your reason for
attending and for the attending itself: they causally affect what
you see, but are not themselves grounds for it.
This is not to say that the directness requirement of Pylyshyn’s
conception of cognitive penetration plays no role in turning
aside challenges arising from covert attentional effects. To see
this, consider the following objection. It might be worried that
the argument just given hinges on the kind of case we are
considering, where one has simply followed the experimenter’s
instruction. But perhaps things are otherwise with at least some
more internally generated intentions to attend. Suppose one
decides to attend on the basis on some belief about what one will
see. For example, you need something red to balance out a design
and believe something red is over there. Attending there will raise
the probability of your getting something red. So, you attend
there and, as a result, see something red there. Here we seem
to have an appropriate semantic relation between a cognitive
state (the belief that something red is there) and the resulting
perception (a visual representation as of something red there).
But even though the belief in part causes the perception and
their contents seem to stand in an appropriate relation, it is not
the case that the perceiver or her visual system treats the belief
as evidence for what she sees. This point can be developed in
terms of directness: the visual system does not itself access, and
so does not take into account, the person’s belief that something
red is there; it is just influenced by the action command that
in part results from the belief, given how one reasoned what
to do. Moreover, the worries raised above about appealing to
directness do not apply here: it is contentious to deny that the
action command is a cognitive state, but less so to deny that
the belief that helps generate the action command in a case like
this is not itself accessed by early vision—at least insofar as the
belief ’s attentional effect is concerned (we return to this caveat in
discussing attention and expectation below).
Perhaps one may argue that in fact the semantic coherence
constraint, properly understood, is also not satisfied in this
case. Consider the distinction between one claim’s providing
a reason for another and one claim in fact being the reason
for which someone upholds a claim. (For example, it might be
that A entails B, and one believes both A and B, but one does
not believe B on the basis of A because one does not realize
that A entails B—nor does one, or one’s reasoning capacity,
otherwise encode or “embody” the entailment.)6 If we may apply
an analogous distinction in theorizing about the visual system,
then we might suggest that semantic coherence requires not
just that the cognitive state in part cause the perception and
that as a matter of fact there be a semantic relation between
their contents, but that the content of the former be part of the
basis upon which the content of the latter is generated. This
might seem to eliminate the need to advert to directness in
replying to such cases after all. But whether this is so depends
on what precisely providing a basis requires. A natural cashing
out would require directness: being able to access and operate
over the cognitive state. If so, this formulation of semantic
coherence would simply build in directness. Note though that,
even if semantic coherence were construed broadly to include
directness, it would not collapse the two constraints: semantic
coherence would still go beyond directness. What we have seen
is that attentional parameters in visual computations provide an
example of how representations can be accessed and operated
over without their role in the computation being appropriately
inference-like in Pylyshyn’s sense. Otherwise put, they show
that, even though a computational transition might itself be
deemed an inference, or inference-like, not all elements of the
computation need be (quasi-)reason-giving. Attentional weights
affect computations in a different way.
Let us take stock. We suggest that, for cognitively driven
attentional effects on perception to amount to cognitive
penetration, there must be propositional attitudes that generate
an attentional command. The attentional command finds a
place in computational models of perceptual processing along
the following highly schematized lines: f (s, a) = p—where
‘s’ represents the sensory signal, ‘a’ the attentional command
(attentional weighting), and ‘p’ the resulting perceptual state.7
6I am bracketing various further nuances. For example, A might be a non-entailing
reason for B, but one may not uphold B on the basis of A, not because one does not
realize that A is a reason for B, but because other, overall stronger considerations
lead one to deny B.
7Of course, less schematized models can allow sub-transitions from perceptual
states, weighted by attention, to further perceptual states; inputs from other
sources; probabilistic states; and many other complications. And they will
unpack f.
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This introduces a variety of candidate loci for cognitive
penetration, in part depending on whether the attentional
command is a cognitive state or not. The candidates are: the
attitudes’ effect on the command, the command’s effect on the
perception, and the attitudes’ effect on the perception. But the
attentional command does not stand in the appropriate semantic
relation to the resulting perceptual state for it to penetrate
perception. And if one maintains further—albeit contentiously—
that the attentional command is not a cognitive state, then it
is not even a candidate source of penetration. The relation of
the generating attitudes to the attentional command does satisfy
the semantic criterion. But this is irrelevant if the attentional
command is itself a cognitive state and so not a candidate
object of penetration. And if the attentional command is not
a cognitive state, still, it is not a perception (and thus not
a candidate object of cognitive penetration), even if it is a
representation in perception in the sense of being operated
over in perceptual processing. Finally, though the attitudes that
generate the attentional command can sometimes have reason-
giving content relative to the resulting perceptual state, in such
cases the directness requirement is violated, since perceptual
processing, so far as the attentional effect is concerned, does not
access—in that sense is not sensitive to—the content. (And this
might violate semantic coherence as well on a broad construal.)
Cognitively driven attentional effects on early vision thus
do not provide examples of cognitive penetration in Pylyshyn’s
sense. But not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if there
are attentional effects that do not occur before or after early
vision, they still fail to satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements—either of
directness or of semantic coherence.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER DEFENSES
We can sharpen these points by differentiating our defense from
Raftopoulos’s (2009) and Firestone and Scholl’s (2015, 2016)
defenses of similar positions.
Raftopoulos
Raftopoulos (2009) argues that perception—by which he means
early vision sans sensation—is not cognitively penetrated.
Drawing in part upon Lamme and colleagues (e.g., Lamme,
2003), Raftopoulos argues that early visual processing culminates
around 120 ms after stimulus onset, following a feed-forward
sweep that leads to the establishment of locally recurring
networks; post-perceptual cognitive processes involve later top-
down feedback from higher cortical areas. His emphasis on time-
course provides one way of supporting Pylyshyn’s suggestion that
computational stages do not necessarily line-up with location
in the cortical hierarchy, since later temporal stages reuse areas
implicated in earlier stages. But, contra Pylyshyn on attention,
Raftopoulos adduces evidence that within this time-frame, one
finds cognitively driven attentional effects, stemming from pre-
stimulus cueing, upon early vision.
Raftopoulos argues that, nonetheless, these attentional effects
do not constitute cognitive penetration. For, though they facilitate
processing, they do not affect the resulting perceptual content
(e.g., Raftopoulos, 2009, p. 83). This claim seems in tension
with his later suggestion that such attentional effects constrain
the interpretation of ambiguous figures (Raftopoulos, 2009, pp.
294–295).8 But, in any event, it also commits him to rejecting
Carrasco’s interpretation of her results as showing attentional
effects on content in early vision—whether he might reject it on
Schneider’s grounds or some other. Our arguments require no
such commitment.9
Note also that Raftopoulos (2015), like Pylyshyn, argues that
later vision is indeed cognitively penetrated. But their arguments
differ. Pylyshyn, as we saw, adduces cases where cognitive states
are accessed in attributing further features. While some of
Raftopoulos’ arguments take this form, Raftopoulos also adverts
to attentional effects not involving access to other cognitive states
(Raftopoulos, 2015, pp. 283–284). Our defense of Pylyshyn would
also preclude such attentional effects in later vision from counting
as cognitive penetration. Cases, however, where attention is what
facilitates the access of relevant cognitive states are another
matter—see Raftopoulos (2015, p. 284f). Nor, more generally,
would our considerations speak to the non-attention-centered
arguments that Raftopoulos, like Pylyshyn, advances.
Firestone and Scholl
Firestone and Scholl (2015, p. 36) appear to agree with our reply
on Pylyshyn’s behalf when they argue that at least some covert
attentional effects on perception “may be occasioned by a relevant
intention or belief, but they are not sensitive to the content of
that intention or belief.” (They limit their scope to “many” such
effects, allowing that there may be other more “rich and nuanced”
cases not covered.) But consider how they argue for their claim:
A critical commonality [with overt attention or turning off
the lights], perhaps, is that the influence of attention (or
eye movements) in such cases is completely independent of
why you attended that way. Having the lights turned off will
have the same effect on visual perception regardless of why
they were turned off, including whether you turned them off
intentionally or accidentally; in both cases it’s the change in
the light doing the work, not the antecedent intention. And in
similar fashion, attention may enhance what is seen regardless
of the reasons that led you to deploy attention in that way,
and even whether you attended voluntarily or via involuntary
attentional capture; in both cases, it’s the change in attention
doing the work, not the antecedent intention (Firestone and
Scholl, 2015, pp. 35–36).
Firestone and Scholl’s main point, translated into our
terms, is that it is the attentional command that does the
8Some of Raftopoulos’ other remarks (e.g., Raftopoulos, 2009, p. 322) likewise
suggest that spatial attention does affect perceptual content, but only in virtue of
selecting what signals get (fully) processed, not in virtue of any further effect on
processing. He deems such effects indirect, but it is not clear in what sense, since
he allows effects of spatial attention within early vision.
9Raftopoulos’ view that attention only facilitates processing without affecting
perceptual content is in part buttressed by his view that perception delivers
“rich” iconic representations. For some challenges to the evidence in favor of
“rich” over “sparse” perceptual representations in vision, see Gross and Flombaum
(forthcoming).
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work, regardless of what generated it. This, we have seen,
justifies the conclusion that propositional attitudes that generate
an attentional command do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s directness
requirement. So, we indeed agree with Firestone and Scholl’s
conclusion to this extent. But their discussion is incomplete; the
directness constraint cannot by itself do all the necessary work.
Note first that Firestone and Scholl’s talk of attention’s
influence on perception might suggest that, even in the covert
case, we should conceive of attention as a faculty or capacity
distinct from perception. But, similarly to Mole (2015), Firestone
and Scholl (2016, p. 24) also write: “Our project concerns
the ‘joint’ between perception and cognition, and attention
unquestionably belongs on the ‘perception’ side of this joint”. The
apparent tension vanishes if we import our distinction between
the attentional command and the attentional effect. But doing
so also helps us see that Firestone and Scholl have left undone
some of the work we undertook above. At the risk of repetition,
let us review how this plays out. If attention is located on the
side of perception, then one might argue the generation of an
attentional command from propositional attitudes is itself a direct
effect of cognition on perception. Now we have a choice point.
If we allow that the attentional command, and not just the
attentional effect, is indeed located on the side of perception,
then we need to argue that, though the attentional command is
a representation in perception, it is not itself a perception. If we
rather place the attentional command in cognition, then it is not
even a candidate target of penetration and clearly the directness
of its relation to the generating attitudes is irrelevant. But then
we must ask about the relation between the attentional command
and the resulting effect. Here directness is not the issue, but rather
semantic coherence—and this constraint is absent from Firestone
and Scholl’s argument.
It may seem otherwise, since they speak of sensitivity to
content. But reflection on their argument makes it clear they
have in mind directness, not semantic coherence. Consider a
case where I in fact come to believe X by inferring it from Y,
but I could have acquired belief X via hypnosis. That I could
have acquired the belief in another way does not change the
fact that I actually acquired it via a cognitive state that provides
a reason in its favor. Similarly, as we saw, the attitudes that
generate an attentional command can likewise satisfy semantic
coherence (on its narrow construal) relative to the resulting
perceptual state. That the same attentional command could
have been otherwise generated is irrelevant, so far as semantic
coherence is concerned. But these alternatives do matter for
establishing indirectness, which is thus what Firestone and
Scholl’s focus on the irrelevance of what caused the attentional
change must be about. So, there is a distinction (between
attentional commands and effects) and a further requirement for
cognitive penetration (semantic coherence) that Firestone and
Scholl omit.
TWO OBJECTIONS
We conclude by replying to two objections. According to the
first, attention should be assimilated to expectation; and, once
it is, cognitively driven attentional effects, recharacterized in a
Bayesian framework, seem to satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements.
According to the second, we need not stick with Pylyshyn’s
characterization of cognitive penetrability in any event; and,
on some other, well-motivated conceptions, cognitively driven
attentional effects can indeed amount to cognitive penetration.
Attention as Expectation
Above, we considered the objection that covert attention does
not involve a distinct faculty intermediate between cognition
and perception. We responded by arguing that, nonetheless,
one may distinguish between an attentional command and
attentional effects—adding that attentional weightings, common
in computational models, are naturally construed as attentional
commands. This restored a notion of attentional cause without
reifying an attentional faculty.
It may be replied that this does not take sufficiently
seriously the claim that attentional effects are a by-product of
perceptual processing and do not involve attentional causes at
all (Anderson, 2011; Vincent, 2015). The ‘by-product’ claim
is often developed within a Bayesian framework that treats
attentional effects as resulting from expectations (Dayan and
Zemel, 1999). On the Bayesian approach, perception solves the
problem of inferring the distal scene from noisy, ambiguous
sensory signals by performing, or approximating, a Bayesian
inference that balances the likelihood of a sensory signal,
given a candidate distal cause, and the prior probability
of that cause. To say, in this framework, that attentional
effects result from expectations is thus to say that observed
attentional effects can be accounted for in terms of the priors
perception brings to bear in inferring distal causes (e.g., Rao,
2005).
If all attentional effects could be accounted for in this way,
the model would require no specifically attentional parameters.
For example, rather than a command to attend this much to
this location, there might be an increased expectation that the
target will be there. Moreover, not only would the expectation
cause the attentional effect, it would do so because perception
would take it into account in (quasi-) inferentially generating
its output.10 Replacing attentional commands with expectations
would thus both remove the barrier to directness and guarantee
the satisfaction of semantic coherence.
This would not settle all questions concerning cognitive
penetration. First, one could still ask whether the accessed
expectations, particularly in cases where the effect was on
early vision, were in fact cognitive states (beliefs about the
future). Second, given recent debates concerning the intended
or appropriate Marrian level of Bayesian models (e.g., Bowers
and Davis, 2012a,b; Griffiths et al., 2012—and cf. Marr, 1982),
one might attempt to reinstate a directness challenge elsewhere.
Questions of cognitive penetrability are arguably posed at
10In effect, perception says: “This sensory signal is difficult to interpret: it could
be caused by a variety of things. But the expectation of there being something
red there gives me some reason to think it is more likely the signal was caused
by something red than by something blue. So, let us go with that.” (We add ‘quasi’
above in deference to those who reserve the term ‘inference’ for relevant operations
over conceptual representations—e.g., Burge, 2010.)
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the algorithmic level, but Bayesian models are sometimes put
forward as computational-level claims. If so, the question
remains open whether at the algorithmic level early vision
directly accesses cognitive expectations—or whether the effects
of cognitive expectations are rather mediated by effects, say,
on imagery (Macpherson, 2012; Block, 2016—though see Gross
et al., 2014) or on visual working memory.
But, in any event, there is an antecedent problem: attention
in fact dissociates from expectation (Summerfield and Egner,
2009, 2016; Summerfield and de Lange, 2014). For example,
endogenous cues can direct attention even when they are
uninformative about the target. Moreover, neurophysiologically
attention is associated with enhanced neural response, while
expectation is associated with reduced neural response (Yoshiura
et al., 1999). Bayesian models without attentional parameters only
handle phenomena where attention and expectation coincide;
Bayesian models that attempt to address the dissociation tend
to reintroduce attentional parameters (e.g., Whiteley and Sahani,
2012).11
It may be replied that this defense of Pylyshyn fails even if
only some cognitively driven attentional effects can be treated as
resulting from (cognitive) expectations. But the reintroduction of
attentional parameters—supposing such models are accepted—
argues for a natural divide among phenomena. On such a
view, effects not explained attentionally are not attentional
effects after all. This might seem a Pyrrhic victory, if the non-
attentional expectation effects demonstrate there is cognitive
penetration in any event. But this paper is not a defense
of cognitive impenetrability tout court, only of the non-
penetrability of cognitively driven attentional effects. It remains
a question of course whether there is expectation-based cognitive
penetration—recall the other issues mentioned above. But if
there is, it is important to distinguish it from cognitively driven
attentional effects. We want to know not just whether there is
cognitive penetration, but also, if there is, the details of how it
does and does not occur.
What Should Cognitive Penetrability Be?
Finally, Pylyshyn’s characterization of cognitive penetration is
not the only one. Some others also preclude attentional effects.
For example, Macpherson (2012) explicitly rules out effects of
spatial attention (though see Macpherson, 2015 for a change of
heart):
11Attentional parameters are sometimes construed in terms of a different kind
of expectation: an expectation concerning precision in the signal, as opposed
to an expectation concerning its distal cause (e.g., Feldman and Friston, 2010—
though, as it happens, they suggest the effects of endogenous cues do not involve
cognitive states). It is suggested that, within a predictive coding framework, one
can thus account for differences in neural response associated with attention
and expectation concerning the stimulus. (A mechanism that increases gain
is typically hypothesized, but recall Pestilli et al., 2011 and Orhan and Ma,
2015, cited above.) However, just as attention can be directed independently of
expectations concerning the distal scene, it can be directed in the absence of
expectations concerning stimulus precision. Attention thus dissociates from this
kind of expectation as well. (An attention shift may cause higher precision, and
in this sense it would be reasonable to expect higher precision to result. But the
point is that an attention shift need not result from an independent expectation of
precision. Thus, it cannot be construed as reason-giving.) For criticisms, consonant
with our views, of predictive coding accounts of attention, see Ransom et al. (2017).
. . . perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable if it is not
possible for two subjects (or one subject at different times) to
have two different experiences on account of a difference in
their cognitive systems which makes this difference intelligible
when certain facts about the case are held fixed, namely, the
nature of the [effect of the] proximal stimulus on the sensory
organ, the state of the sensory organ, and the location of
attentional focus of the subject. (Macpherson, 2012, p. 29)12
But some alternative characterizations do not preclude
attentional effects. Stokes (2013, p. 650) suggests that “[a]
perceptual experience E is cognitively penetrated if and only if (1)
E is causally dependent upon some cognitive state C and (2) the
causal link between E and C is internal and mental.” The second
constraint rules out overt, but not covert attentional shifts. Wu
(forthcoming) argues that cognitively driven attentional effects
on perception amount to cognitive penetration by explicitly
dropping Pylyshyn’s semantic coherence constraint in favor
of a weaker statistical, or correlational, notion of information
penetration.
Which conception of cognitive penetration should we use?
Which gets the phenomenon right, or marks an important
joint, or is the most fruitful? In particular, is it Pylyshyn’s?
A tempting reply is that ‘cognitive penetration’ is a technical
term, which Pylyshyn coined; so, how it could he fail to
get it right? But someone can put their finger on something
without quite articulating what matters most. Indeed, the 1999
formulation on which we have focused is itself a modification of
Pylyshyn’s earlier statements. (See Stokes, 2013 for discussion and
references.)
Stokes (2015) suggests we assess the candidates in terms
of their consequences—especially their consequences for the
questions that drive our interest in cognitive penetrability in
the first place. He underscores two kinds of consequence in
particular: for questions concerning cognitive architecture and
for questions in epistemology. And he argues that Pylyshyn’s
characterization, though it has an epistemic dimension in virtue
of its requirement of semantic coherence, fails to connect with
the epistemological questions. We can see this in relation more
specifically to cases involving cognitively driven attention by
noting, for example, their importance for issues of bias (cf. Lyons,
2015; Wu, forthcoming; Silins, 2016 surveys epistemological
questions connected to cognitive penetrability). Some questions
of cognitive architecture likewise seem not to turn on semantic
coherence: even if valuing or desiring money affects the
perceived size of coins (Bruner and Goodman, 1947—but see
Landis et al., 1966), it does not provide a reason for this
shift.13
12Macpherson (2012, pp. 43–46) is inclined, however, to allow feature-based
attention. Incidentally, her formulation does not preclude other indirect effects:
her paper defends an indirect mechanism—via mental imagery—for the cognitive
penetration of color experience. See Gross et al. (2014) for discussion.
13Semantic coherence is also not relevant for various questions concerning the
causal effect of non-cognitive, but non-perceptual, states (e.g., states directing
motor systems and some emotional states) on perceptual states. Of course
these are not then questions of cognitive penetrability, but they are interesting
questions nonetheless and are relevant to debates about modularity, on some
characterizations.
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But an alternative approach, which Stokes mentions but
does not develop, would consider the consequences for various
debates one at a time, instead of attempting to find a single
characterization of cognitive penetrability that fits them all (cf.
Siegel, 2015). Pylyshyn’s characterization (pace Stokes, 2013,
p. 659, fn. 5) has a specific motivation, outlined above: to see
whether early vision is “continuous” with cognition in virtue
of early visual states standing in the same kind of relation to
cognitive states that cognitive states can stand in with regard to
one another. This renders of interest questions formulated using
his characterization regardless of their bearing on other questions
also of interest.14
There are many phenomena and questions of interest here.
We can be pluralists about our interests. As for the label
14 Firestone and Scholl (2015, 2016) provide a different motivation for
characterizations that preclude attentional effects: such effects are mainstream in
perception science and fairly well-understood, whereas cognitive penetration is
supposed to be a surprising, radical claim. Purveyors of the ‘all levels’ objection
might respond that the goalposts have unfairly shifted: that attentional effects are
bound up with perception at all levels was not so mainstream when Pylyshyn
rejected the claim. We have provided an alternative Pylyshyan reply to the ‘all levels’
objection. But, in any event, perhaps Firestone and Scholl could add that, if we want
to keep our questions interesting, shifting the goalposts is the right thing to do as
knowledge progresses.
‘cognitive penetrability,’ since discussion has proceeded in several
directions, we can be pluralist about that as well, so long as
we are clear. This does not mean that any characterization of
‘cognitive penetrability’ is as good as another. Some may have no
interest at all. Which do will get sorted out in the light of further
investigation, theoretical and empirical. We have argued that
Pylyshyn’s question is of interest and that his answer, regarding
attentional effects, is correct—although not for the reason he
emphasizes.
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